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Abstract In many industrialized countries ethicists and lawyers favour advance
directives as a tool to guarantee patient autonomy in end-of-life-decisions. However,
most citizens seem reluctant to adopt the practice; the number of patients who have an
advance directive is low across most countries. The article discusses the key argument
for seeing such documents as an instrument of self-interpretation and life-planning,
which ultimately have to be interpreted by third parties as well. Interpretation by third
parties and the process of self-reflection are conceptually linked by a qualitative
concept of identity. Identity is conceived here as constructed in a processual dialogue
between a personal and a cultural perspective. How the cultural dimension comes into
play in understanding the motivation, rejection or content of wished for end-of-life-
decisions, is shown by a brief review of empirical and cultural studies. Understanding
advance directives as a culturally embedded tool of self-interpretation should help to
overcome urgent moral problems in clinical settings: how to interpret such docu-
ments, how to deliberate on the content and on the best form.
Keywords Advance directives  Culture  Identity  Ethics of a good life 
Moral desirability  Interpretation  Proxy
Introduction
Many doctors, ethicists, and lawyers presently perceive advance directives as tools
for ensuring autonomy and enforcing personal wishes regarding medical treatment.
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In recent years, governmental policies or national ethics committees have
strengthened the binding character of advance directives in many countries [20].
Denmark, for e.g., has had specific legislation to stipulate advance directives since
1992, Israel since 2005, Austria since 2006, while in Germany there is currently a
parliamentary debate on three bills differing in their answer to the question of how
binding such documents should be. It is known, however, that advance directives (or
so called ‘living wills’) pose serious practical and ethical problems related to
continuity, liability, completeness, interpretation and the relationship between
rejected and demanded medical treatments, all of which have been intensively
discussed (see e.g., [6]).
This debate over advance directives is dominated by normative questions,
embedded in both deontological and consequentialistic approaches. Advance
directives are discussed as a tool for respecting the rights and interests of patients
and raise the question of what duties physicians and others have towards such
documents. Despite the controversies, it seems that the majority of medical ethicists,
lawyers and physicians presently tend to regard advance directives as reasonable
[21].
But one should keep in mind that the majority of the population in many western,
highly industrialized countries does not currently hold an advance directive. Only
3–23% of people hold an advance directive according to studies in USA, Israel,
Netherlands and Germany (see [21, 22, 26]). Why is this? The few studies done in
this field suggest several reasons: a lack of information regarding the opportunity to
create advance directives, fear of abuse by physicians [27] but also moral confusion
and avoidance of ‘negative thinking’ [28].
These normative questions are neither solved nor obsolete. But for anybody
who holds a very liberal position, centered on autonomy and oriented around
negative freedom, it seems obvious that citizens should decide freely if they want
to hold an advance directive or not. From this perspective, there seems no need
for further discussion of why to compose and how to interpret an advance
directive. In response to this position my first goal is here to investigate whether
the writing of advance directives is relevant from an ethical perspective of seeking
a good life and what implications this would have for their interpretation by third
parties. My second, more profound goal is to show how concrete bioethical
questions are intermingled with fundamental ideas of identity. However, concepts
of identity require in turn a critical reflection on the relationship between the
individual and society.
In the following, my argumentation is structured around four main topics. Firstly,
I want to discuss the role of the ethics of a good life for advance directives, and here
especially I want to explore identity as a central reference point. As a second issue, I
will touch on the question how socio-cultural factors interplay with identity and
personal attitudes, especially in this field. My third argument is that there is a need
for higher sensitivity towards cultural identity because of its relevance in the
interpretation of such documents by third parties. Finally, I will briefly sketch
implications for current practice.
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The Role of an Ethics of the Good Life for Advance Directives
and Decision-Making
Advance directives are documents which encompass preferences, values, and
anticipated situations for end of life situations. They centre on defining a ‘good
death’. In the clinical setting they show great variety in the way they are composed:
hand-written letters, filled-in pages of multiple choice questionnaires, video tapes
etc. They result from a person’s primary decision to draft such a document. As the
survey of Sahm et al. [27] showed, being diagnosed with a life-threatening disease
increases the tendency to concern oneself with end of life treatment. Here, ‘being
affected’ means to gain specific experience (e.g., handle a cancer diagnosis) and to
be confronted with concrete decisions (e.g., choice of medical treatment). But the
status of being affected itself depends on epistemic and normative premises which
can differ strongly [31]. For example, young healthy persons enjoying a risky life
style (e.g., by hang gliding, or motor bicycling) may regard themselves as ‘being
affected’ by end of life decisions because they are aware of being exposed to higher
risks of life-threatening injuries. Therefore, the need for an advance directive is less
justified by an objective status of being chronically ill or getting old as the study of
Sahm et al. [27] may suggest. The need seems more likely be triggered by the
individual wish to care about the own death and to clarify one’s very personal ideas
concerning the own body—in order of being reflective of one’s own identity.
Decisions for or against an advance directive could thus be addressed in terms
of moral desirability and questions of a good life. ‘Ethics of a good life’ is used
here as an umbrella term which encompasses both virtue ethics as the ethical
reflection of a morally meritorious life which is responsive to the demands of the
world [17] as well as so called ‘perfectionism’ [16]. When we discuss ‘ethics of a
good life’ we pay attention to a number of topics that have been mostly neglected
by modern moral philosophy: virtues and moral character, moral education, moral
wisdom or discernment, friendship and family relationships, a deep concept of
happiness, the role of the emotions in our moral life and the fundamentally
important questions of what sort of person I should be and how we should live
(see [17]).1 Therefore, ethics of a good life always encompasses an individual and
a social dimension.
Life Planning and Ethical Deliberation About the Own Death: Handling
Uncertainties and Self-Reflexivity
I follow here an approach that integrates two strands often separated in ethical
theory: on the one hand normative ethical questions asking ‘‘What ought/shall
someone do?’’, and on the other hand such ethical questions of a good life asking
‘‘What do I want to do?/How do I want to live?’’. I follow the idea, posed by various
philosophers, that in modern life, moral reflection always encompasses these two
questions, but depends on the prevailing context: in political dimensions and
1 Here I cannot go into a more detailed analysis which of these topics are more important than others nor
do I defend a specific strand of virtue ethics.
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questions of justice the ‘ought’ dimension prevails [10, 24], while in personal
relationships and the family context ‘‘moral desirability and wisdom’’ prevails—as
long as basic rights and interests of others are not harmed. For example, Habermas
[10] classifies in his discourse ethics the first class of questions as ‘moral questions’
while those in the second class are ‘ethical questions’. Other philosophers such as
Kra¨mer [18] and Haker [11] use German terms (Germ.: Sollensethik/Strebensethik)
which may be translated as ‘‘ethics of ought’’ and ‘‘ethics of moral desirability in
one’s own life’’. The first notion encompasses deontological and consequentialistic
approaches (and also some aspects of virtue ethics; see above), while the second
encompasses personal virtues and relational, contextual approaches that refer to a
meaningful life. Ethics—in its various dimensions—is here understood as reflection
on morality as a set of practical norms and everyday life customs, a reflection that
seeks for a justification why some actions and decisions are better than others.
At this point one may ask why a theoretical distinction of ethics of good life and
ethics of ought has (or ought to have) any interest for bioethics, especially for
advance directives.
One important reason stems from Rawls when he referred to the importance of
rational life plans for a good life, a human well-being [24, §63]. According to this,
normative reasoning does not only concern social questions of justice, distribution,
rights and freedom but also how we rank our own wishes, interests and moral
motives with respect to gain a rational plan, that is with full awareness of the
relevant factors and after a careful consideration of the consequences. As Rawls
puts it, ‘‘[t]he aim of deliberation is to find that plan which best organizes our
activities and influences the formation of our subsequent wants so that our aims and
interests can be fruitfully combined into one scheme of conduct’’ (410f). In this line
of argumentation thinking about our own death in the context of modern clinical
treatment could be seen as a reasonable way of handling the modern risk of
uncertainty about what might happen to us in a situation where we depend on life-
sustaining machines. This should be accepted as an important part of our way of life
instead of criticizing it as narcistic behaviour or waste of time as the social
philosophers Anthony Giddens correctly states: ‘‘Life planning in respect of the
body is hence not necessarily narcissistic—like other aspects of reflexivity of self-
identity, body-planning is more often an engagement with the outside world than a
defensive withdrawal from it’’ [8, p. 178]. To be clear about another distinction, this
sort of ethical reasoning will not end in recommendations for laws and social
policies but is part of self-reflexivity in modern societies.
Deontological questions such as ‘‘Is it morally acceptable to withdraw medical
treatment or to commit suicide?’’ are to my understanding fundamental and are
normatively paramount compared to an ethical reflection on ‘‘how do I want to die/
what is my perspective of a (morally) good death’’. But I understand the latter
question as ‘preceding’ the context of planning one’s decisions regarding the end of
life—as precedent chronologically and in everyday life. Furthermore, questions of
an ethics of ought and those of an ethics of a good life cannot be separated in
defining the responsibilities of proxies because here personal values and virtues as
trust and love define moral duties such as liability and responsibility (e.g., in the
case ‘‘My son, whom I trust more than my daughter, should decide when the
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life-supporting treatment should be withdrawn when I am not able any more to
communicate’’).
The question remains in which cases writing an advance directive could be
indicated and what should be considered in the light of the above reflections. If I am
convinced that dealing with illness and death in a near or remote future would have
negative long-time impacts on my psyche, then good reasons are at hand not to
formulate an advance directive (see [4]). On the other hand, specific considerations
about my own notion of a good life can be a reason to formulate one because I have
very specific expectations about my preferences and what I understand as a good
death. But merely informing others about my concrete preferences could be in many
clinical cases insufficient. Proxies, doctors, and lawyers often must interpret these
documents, which means construing and assessing these wishes and preferences
under new circumstances. Some people hold conceptions of illness, death,
embodiment and care in the family, which are quite complex. Moreover, such
considerations are always based on the respective cultural meaning of illness, death,
and body, as many sociologists, ethnologists and anthropologists have convincingly
demonstrated (see e.g., [15]) (see below). Hence, an individual explanation of our
own reasons and cultural background assumptions (what I call here ‘identity’) is
part of a positive conception of patient autonomy as it will reduce uncertainty, avoid
misunderstandings, and provide a helping hand for interpretation in situations we
cannot anticipate in detail.
‘Identity’ as a Reference Point for the Relationship of a Person
and Her Social Embedding
On my understanding, ‘identity’ is a central anchor for all questions regarding the
ethics of a good life. This is because exploring how one wants to be requires
clarifying who one is.
There has been an exploding interest in identity in philosophy, sociology and
political science in the last decade. At the same time, various voices have raised
concerns and critiques regarding the concept of identity, mainly influenced by
postmodern views or analytical approaches. In these positions ‘‘identity’’ is regarded
as problematic because of its essentialistic connotations and its association with
subjectivity and truth (see [12]). Thus, no one can take for granted what is meant by
the term ‘identity’. However, as the British sociologist Stuart Hall put it once, the
concept of identity should be understood as something that is constituted within
representation (language, discourses, cultural practice), not solely from outside
[12, p. 4]: ‘‘…we need to understand them [identities] as produced in specific
historical and institutional sites within discursive formations and practices, by
specific enunciative strategies.’’ Hall defends the need for identity in a better
understanding how discourses, practice and social framework interact with
subjectivity, psychological mechanisms and the self-positioning of subjects. For
Hall, ‘culture’ and ‘cultural identity’ are necessary for understanding how the public
(e.g., the audience of media/politics) give meaning to texts and messages. There is
no passive reception but an active process of giving meaning, negotiation, and
interpretation. I believe that this observation also has importance for the bioethical
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debate on advance directives: we should be aware that these are ‘texts’ which are
composed and interpreted within cultural practices of interaction but that they are
also a construct of a discoursive practice that induces identity.
Precisely this interaction is also an important reference point for many (if not all)
ethical questions in applied ethics. In applied ethics and political philosophy we
cannot renounce the debate about concepts of identity [25].
At this point one might ask why a theory of identity and society has, or ought to
have, any ethical interest. Why not simply leave such theorizing to the sociologists
and cultural theorists? One important answer is given by Charles Taylor in his
analysis of the liberal-communitarian debate. Taylor [36, pp. 182ff] shows that the
way how we conceptualize the relationship between the self, identity and society is
closely linked to normative stances concerning basic ethical question such as rights
and duties, freedom and solidarity etc. The ontological question, whether human
agents are related to society more in an atomistic or more in a holistic way, hints at a
core premise for understanding different moral points of view. To be more specific:
bioethics, too, relies—just as political philosophy—on anthropological and ethical
premises. Because we cannot do without ‘identity’ a critical reflection on the
conditions for defining and constructing categories of identity is needed.
At this point, I favour an interpretation of identity that aims at defining it as a
qualitative concept [25, p. 69]. This concept of personal identity, as suggested by
Taylor [33], is based on developmental-psychological and social-psychological,
cultural as well as linguistic-pragmatic assumptions. It designates a practical self-
image, that assumes that the question ‘‘What person am I?’’ comes along with the
question ‘‘What community/group are we?’’. This correspondence of personal and
socio-cultural identity is established during the shared implementation of social
interaction. Identity is conceptualized as a processual, reflexive and intersubjec-
tively constituted development. Competing interpretations of identity may exist.
They are assessed, re-interpreted and weighted by the individual during the course
of his or her life. ‘Identity’ itself could be seen as an object of negotiation and self-
positioning. This notion is most convincing for modern societies, as Anthony
Giddens argues [8, 175ff]. Moreover, Giddens argues that it is rather implausible to
believe that the individual is essentially passive in relation to overwhelming
external social or cultural forces. But modern social life offers mixed opportunities.
Traditional as well as modern cultural ways of life offer resources and various
narratives which the human agent uses as possible models for their life plans—but
not as fixed stories. Individuals are actively restructuring new forms of gender,
family relations, religion, working place, healing etc. However, the role of such
models, (or great narratives) or social frameworks should not be underestimated: If
we intend to understand and to position ourselves it is necessary to identify these
frameworks and to reflect on them.
The social framework that Charles Taylor deems so important for identity
formation can be considered as ‘‘language’’ or ‘‘culture’’ [25, pp. 75f]. At this point
I want to focus on culture, including communication and interpretation as an
intrinsic part of language. Culture means here socially shared values and historically
grown and culturally interpreted structures. These are expressed by affiliation to
cultural institutions and ways of life as for example in religious communities,
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ethnicities, generations, political groups, nationalities or in daily social life. These
ways of life can be distinguished by the fact that they offer explicit explanations of
hermeneutic self-interpretation, i.e., in part answers to the question ‘‘what are we?’’.
Charles Taylor provides for this purpose the metaphor of culture as a moral-
cognitive topography. Social forms of life and institutions always include implicit
and unarticulated ideas, interpretations or explanations for differentiations between
important and unimportant, good and bad, nature, the position of human beings in
the community, the role of knowledge, etc. [33]. The same point on identity—but
more concretely—emerges from Appiah [1] in his work on identity, political
liberalism and moral philosophy. Appiah argues very well how social ‘identity’
should be understood in a process between the individual and his cultural
embeddings. The structure of this shaping process, of ‘‘making up people’’, is
threefold: it includes ‘identification’ as a moral-cognitive process of the individuals
to ‘‘shape their projects—including their plans for their own lives and their
conception of the good life’’ (p. 66). This requires ‘labels’ which must be available
in the public discourse (e.g., man, woman, catholic, jew, new age generation,
European, African-American, etc.). These labels express a kind of consensus on
how to identify those to whom they should be applied (like stereotypes) (p. 67).
People chose a certain role. So the second element of a social identity is the
internalization of those labels. The final element is the existence of patterns of
behaviour towards such labeled persons (p. 68). The core idea is that identity
responses (to be treated as ‘‘label’’) is neither morally wrong in general nor morally
neutral. It provides us with an opportunity to self-understanding and taking care for
our own live. But it becomes problematic as soon as identification, internalization,
and ‘treatment as’ fall apart and are used in the political discourse to discriminate
people (the prevention of this discrimination is the liberal goal of justice). These
ideas about identity are not abstract, but experienced, embodied background
understandings. Human beings are ‘‘embodied agents’’ (cf. [35, p. 23]), i.e., they
perceive, express and articulate themselves with their bodies. The body takes on a
special role here: it is not only a means to promote one’s interest, but it also
mediates experiences and communication. The body bears the imprint and traces of
the social and the reverse is also true: social practices are always transmitted
through the body (e.g., at work, at performances, and in medical practice) [14]. This
special meaning of the body should not be underestimated, especially in the context
of medical care and the dying process (see also [30]). When we think about our own
death in terms of the ideal of ‘a good death’, our socio-cultural background is in
many ways constitutive of our personal ideals, wishes, and images about how to
handle a dying person and care for the weak body. This basic concept of cultural
identity as part of our individual identity is explicitly aware of the fact that there are
social powers which may restrict the human agent in his development and self-
understanding. But it emphasizes the aspect of sociality and cultural embeddedness
as a necessary and therefore also normatively relevant condition for planning and
living one’s own life.
To avoid any confusion, I think it is necessary to mention that in medical ethics
another conception of personal identity has dominated the discussions. There,
special emphasis has been placed on the continuity of the reflexive, psychological
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consciousness (cf. [23]). So for example, persons who suffer from dementia as in
Alzheimer’s Disease will lose personal identity because their psychological
continuity is disrupted due to impairments affecting memory. According to this
understanding a moral problem exists in applying a person’s advance directive if
this person is unable to remember having drawn this document. But this reductionist
conception does not help us reflecting on future life plans and on the importance of a
socio-cultural framework in which such person is embedded.
Influence of Socio-Cultural Variables on Advance Directives
In this section, I will review some empirical investigations with the aim of
substantiating my argument that culture and social identity is indeed an important
determinant of personal attitudes towards end of life decisions. Moreover, these
studies provide clues to things we have to keep in mind when interpreting individual
wishes. The empirical investigation of how cultural background correlates with end
of life preferences will not answer any normative questions as to why we should
compose such a living will or what the content should be. But they allow for greater
awareness of our own cultural embeddings. Furthermore, they help to identify areas
of conflict and misunderstanding (for example: if proxies or doctors don’t share the
cultural values of the patients). Making implicit cultural assumptions explicit
supports patients’ self-empowerment and improves communication between
patients and families and doctors, patients and families.
Several studies have compared cultures, ethnicities and countries regarding
decisions at the end of life and advance directives (cf. [3, 4, 19, 29, 38]).
Although I cannot go into too much detail here, I want to illustrate my argument
that preferences and practice vary significantly among individuals not only
because of personal but also because of cultural framings, for example of
belonging to a specific ethnic and religious group. This is—as I tried to argue in
the ‘‘Introduction’’—due to the fact that individuals dedicate themselves to
specific communities and refer to shared rules and norms in the way they deal
with their body and the medical system. Furthermore, the general arrangement
shows that individuals have different, very personal ways of adopting such
cultural rules and ways of thinking for example in end of life decisions—which
supports Hall’s as well as Gidden’s argument of understanding identity as a
process of negotiation and interpretation.
According to various US American studies, belonging to an ‘‘ethnic group’’ is an
important factor in explaining significant differences between the attitudes of
patients [2, 3, 9]. For example Mexican-Americans and Korean-Americans
participating in the surveys had a significantly greater preference for decisions by
family proxies than European-Americans or African-Americans. The former would
also more often agree that diagnoses about fatal diseases should be communicated
only to family members, but not to the patient [2]. As explanation, the interviewed
persons indicated the danger of isolation of the patient, of a psychological shock,
and of losing hope. Here the much discussed, culturally dependent weighting of
family decisions (instead of self-determination) seems to be relevant. However, in a
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modern world these cultural concepts are not totally valid, and nor can they be seen
as monocausally-acting motivations. For example, the study of Morrison (cited in
[9]) in a home for the aged in New York showed that many elderly of different
ethnic backgrounds esteemed important family centered decisions—but at the same
time they themselves did not want to nominate a family member as a proxy. This
concrete refusal can result from biographical experiences of personal conflicts in the
family. In this case the cultural value of the family per se is shared, but not much
trust is put in one’s own family.
According to various surveys, Europeans and European-Americans are more
likely than other Americans to refuse high-tech medicine at the end of life as
‘‘aggressive’’, while African-Americans (patients as well as physicians) prefer it [2].
Perkins et al. [22], also found in their qualitative interview survey that Mexican-
American and European-American patients more often than African-Americans
voice the wish not to receive life-sustaining treatment. The observation that African-
Americans more often wish to receive high tech medicine and life-sustaining
treatment is explained among others with the collectively shared self-conception as
a group that is often disadvantaged in the system [9]. The enhanced wish for
intensive care may result from the background of collectively transmitted fears that
their own ‘‘group’’ is deprived of social (and medical) resources and that one is
more often perceived as a ‘‘second class’’ person (and patient). Thus, collective
experiences with the medical system can also be considered to be culturally rooted:
while members of one group direct their mistrust rather against structural
discrimination, others are rather skeptical towards an increasing so-called
‘‘mechanization’’.
However, it could be objected that the categorization of ethnicities as ‘the one’
relevant socio-cultural category of identity is questionable because it is particularly
ideologically charged and socially constructed. Turner [37] has also noted that
simple ethnic or religious differences should not be used to promote cultural
stereotypes. This objection would become especially relevant where categorizations
are done by external observers. However, if it is based on the self-assessment of the
respondents it can serve as a helpful indication of the cultural frame of reference.
One other factor that is often considered important is religious affinity. It is
known that in some religions illness is considered a divine trial that one has to face
with discipline (among others in Islam) or as fate decided by God that one must
accept (rather a Christian, but partially also a Jewish perspective). However,
according to Perkins et al. [22] religious affinity might be less relevant than
ethnicity.
As ‘culture’, according to Taylor is understood as an umbrella term for socially
shared values and structures, there should be sensitivity for various cultural
secondary aspects. For example, it is reasonable to expect that gender (see also [5]),
socio-economic background, social class, and generation could be important factors
for understanding differences in values, body conceptions and worldviews. It seems
plausible that members of the postwar generation have internalized ‘‘declarations of
war’’ against diseases whereas the post-68 generation and late Hippies are rather
affected by discourses about naturalness and ecology (cf. to differences between
generations regarding values: [13, 32]).
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The results of these various studies suggest that for both empirical research and
ethical reflection, it is necessary to consider personal experience as well as their
variances and ambivalence within a cultural setting.
It becomes clear that in decisions regarding illness and the end of life various
cultural institutions and personal preferences always intertwine: the medical system,
family, religion, being a member of a generation, etc., already offer concrete
valuations and interpretations of the question ‘‘Who are we?’’. These social
institutions have already had an immense influence on an adult—not in the sense of
a mono-directional determination, but in a reciprocal process of social and
individual interpretation. This existing correlation between socio-cultural factors
and individual preferences is often a biographical challenge (see [7]). However, as
long as we are conscious persons, we are able to reflect on and guide this interplay
between personal and cultural identity.
Between Self-Positioning and Interpretation by Third Parties
In the case of end of life situations where a patient is not competent or conscious
any more, the personal and cultural dimensions of identity are situationally
decoupled. This means that the most sensitive aspect in dealing with advance
directives is the delegation of the interpretation to a proxy. This is because in the
moment of the implementation of an advance directive the affected person herself is
no longer able to evaluate the new situation and to express herself. The
interpretation of advance directives through third parties is thus more than a
necessary evil. It is at the core of the aim and meaningfulness of this instrument for
preserving self-interest and putting the patient’s will into practice.
The two corresponding procedures of self-positioning and interpretation by third
parties could be described as a complex process of hermeneutics. In the context of
advance directives, we have to be aware that there are always two different, but not
totally independent processes of interpretation: on the one side there is the complex
process for the author of an advance directive of finding a personal stance towards
one’s own decisions in end of life questions and the other side where there are third
persons who will interpret the document and act on behalf of their interpretation.
This process should be understood as a ‘dialectic’ process of interpretation and
action and not as an objective, deterministic way of ‘applying’ such a document.
For the author of an advance directive it is an important issue to be aware of the
fact that an advance directive could be part of the idea of planning one’s own life.
This idea of a qualitative identity also presupposes certain stabilities and
continuities of our interests, moral attitudes and interpretations. In Taylor’s image
of a moral-cognitive topography, one can visualize these as ‘islands’ or ‘plateaus’.
These stabilities alone allow us to plan our lives and to make decisions. According
to Taylor, self-discovery consists of the possibility ‘‘to create oneself’’, of ‘‘using
the power of imagination’’ [34, p. 73]. In order to act in an authentic way (in the
sense of remaining true to oneself) we must anticipate the future. The drafting of an
advance directive can be interpreted as an anticipated self-interpretation—which
third persons should fulfill out of respect for the self-determination of other persons.
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This socio-cultural dependency of end of life decisions shows that the decision not
to draft an advance directive can also be understood as an expression of a qualitative
personal identity. It may be part of one’s personal self-conception to rely on the
family (or explicitly on others than the family), or on God (as a religious person) or
on experts (as someone who trusts in science and medicine). However, it would be
advantageous if this trust in a proxy decision were explicitly communicated—
otherwise the uncertainty can be expected to lead to many misunderstandings. So
there is no duty to draft an advance directive, but there are good reasons from a
perspective of the ethics of a good life to consider one. If on the other hand someone
conceives autonomy as involving a self-critical reflection on care and concerns about
his own body [30], it becomes morally desirable to write an advance directive.
Some Practical Implications
Recently, many doctors and lawyers have been promoting advance directives.
Obviously they offer a moral and juridical relief. Moreover, there is an emerging
number of guidelines and blank forms to be found on the internet or promoted by
legal bodies. Most of them present simple ‘yes or no’-answers based on multiple
choice questionnaires. Additionally, the recent drafts often suggest nominating a
proxy such as a close relative or friend. This is interesting insofar as it seems that
many people still do not know what the function of a health care proxy is (see [27]).
Furthermore, the qualitative interview study of Sanders et al. [28] pointed to a moral
problem created by such educational material itself: it caused moral confusion and
stress within the group of younger patients they interviewed. One can thus conclude
that the promotion of advance directives without reflection on the broader meaning
for the individual and their surroundings provokes new problems.
The point I want to make here is that end of life decisions are moral dilemmas
concerning most people (in industrialized countries). Once we become aware that
decisions pro or contra life sustaining treatment are part of our own life plan we
pose the question ‘‘What person am I and what is my idea of a good life?’’.
Moreover, this kind of internal moral inquiry is bound up with the meaning of
personal and social identity, as I have argued above. With regard to the concrete
process of drafting an advance directive, we have to answer questions like: (a) Do
I want to be the one who ‘plans’ my life or death in the long-term or should I rely
on others (on God etc.)? (b) Do I consider it wise and morally desirable to commit
myself now to how one could and should treat me in anticipated future situations
(does it relax me or will it induce psychological stress)? (c) Who (of my family,
my friends) do I really trust to act for me as a proxy and to interpret my
document?
Today, only few structures exist (or in most countries none at all) for providing
personnel trained to inform and counsel lay people in these difficult questions.
Furthermore, answers to these questions are required to consider cultural differences
if, as I hope to have shown, the answers to questions about identity and discursive
practice depend on social expectations and cultural ‘labels’ (someone identifies
himself with). The latter we should consider as a chance rather than a risk.
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We need more structures for people to deliberate (and not to force them) on
whether they want to draft an advance directive and if so, with what scope and
content. The theoretical considerations about the interplay between self-interpre-
tation, cultural assumptions and likely interpretation by third parties may allow a
critical view on the recent practice: more needs to be done than just providing
questionnaires and information material if we want to protect and strengthen the
autonomy of the patient.
There are at least three categories of people we have to consider: first, those who
share the idea of being open about one’s own death and the wish to control it with an
advance directive. Second, those who are aware of being a part of a so called ‘death-
denying’ society and explicitly avoid thinking or talking about negative ideas such
as illness and death. Third, persons who are ambivalent and don’t want to make a
decision now.
With regard to the clinical situation I suggest there is a need for improvements on
three levels: first, we need more processual communication and deliberation instead
of unfocused dissemination of material and standard questionnaires. First of all,
people should not be put under pressure to draft an advance directive but should be
provided with information regarding the aims and concrete problems of such a
document. This includes reflecting on the role of a proxy and the likelihood of new
situations which will need further interpretation. It seems that many people fear the
dictatory use of such advance directives (very likely regarding the withdrawal of
life-sustaining treatment) even if they are no longer appropriate to the medical
situation (see [27]). Here, the importance of interpretation and the proxy comes into
play. The aim of such a deliberating process should be to arrive at a standpoint as a
basis for deciding what to do, and this does not have to mean actually drafting an
advance directive.
Second, the role of proxies should be well-defined and legally binding. It
needs to be considered, however, that in practice this often constitutes a moral
and psychological burden for the surrogate decision maker. They themselves will
be in need of persons with whom they may deliberate about the right
interpretation. This kind of support is still missing and could be provided not
only by health care providers but also by social workers and philosophically
guided councellors.
Third, we need more empirical evaluation of the current process that defines how
advance directives are used, modified and assessed by patients and lay people. Here,
a special focus should be on the various sub-categories of cultural impacts.
Additionally, we need more awareness of how talking about one’s own death differs
culturally. There are, indicated by the few studies we have, several forms of
expression and not just one. But the recent medico-juridical discourse tends to
support standardization and legal terminology rather than diversity. It seems very
plausible, however, that we need various alternative methods to express one’s
identity and preferences with respect to end of life decisions. In support of this
argument, various authors have shown that above all narrative approaches and
biographical anecdotes and personal episodes provide important information [29]
which is central for the interpretation of new situations.
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